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INTRODUCTION TO W. BERNARD RICHLAND’S ADDRESS
BEFORE THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR MUNICIPAL
LAW OFFICERS ON OCTOBER 15, 1975*
Bernard Richland, Corporation Counsel for the city of New
York, delivered an optimistic speech to NIMLO, the National Insti-
tute for Municipal Law Officers (now known as IMLA, the Interna-
tional Municipal Lawyers Association) at a time when New York City
had little about which to be optimistic.  The subject was the city’s
fiscal crisis.  Richland’s audience included lawyers from around the
nation and globe who were members of IMLA, a professional or-
ganization which provides resources and advocacy for the nation’s
local government attorneys.1
For decades, the population of New York City had been chang-
ing.2  Middle-income inhabitants moved to the suburbs and took
their tax dollars with them.  Retail trade, along with manufacturing,
followed.  The state, under the guidance of then-Governor Nelson
Rockefeller, failed to provide enough aid to offset the loss in tax
revenues.3
As a result of this realignment, the city was left with a large
population of low-income and impoverished citizens at a time when
“no other large city in this country [had] as many services assigned
to it.”4  Despite the fact that the New York Constitution mandated
that the state bear twenty-five percent of its welfare costs and fifty
percent of the expenses of home relief programs,5 state aid given to
the city for these programs resulted in “the city receiv[ing] less aid
per person than the rest of the state of New York.”6  In addition to
providing its inhabitants with police, fire, and sanitation services,
* By Courtney Rineer, Executive Editor for the Center for New York City Law,
New York Law School Law Review.
1. IMLA HISTORY AND MISSION STATEMENT, at http://www.IMLA.org (last visited
February 25, 2004).
2. Donna E. Shalala & Carol Bellamy, A State Saves a City: The New York Case, 1976
Duke L.J. 1119 (1976).
3. Id. at 1121.
4. Id.
5. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 154 (McKinney 1976).
6. See Donna E. Shalala, State Aid to Local Government, in GOVERNING NEW YORK
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418 NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
the city operated hospitals, primary, secondary, and higher educa-
tion institutions, and subsidized health care and mass
transportation.7
Despite the city’s growing debt, the city’s politicians had a very
hard time cutting back on programs upon which citizens had come
to rely.8  Even when the federal government cut back on aid to wel-
fare programs, New York City’s mayors picked up the slack rather
than scale back the programs.9  From 1961 to 1975, the city’s public
functions, such as higher education, primary and secondary educa-
tion, and welfare, increased ten fold.10  During the same time pe-
riod, the city was only levying taxes to cover a fifth of the money it
was spending on public services.11
Beginning in the 1950’s, New York City’s mayors began utiliz-
ing inventive accounting practices in order to ensure a “balanced”
budget.  Mayor Richard Wagner began these creative accounting
practices by issuing “budget” notes; he certified the city’s budget
deficit, had notes issued in that amount, and budgeted repayment
of the debt in the next year’s budget, creating short-term debt for
the city.12  The following year, there was another budget deficit and
more budget notes were issued.13  In addition to issuing budget
notes that were not repaid, the city balanced its budget by counting
revenues in the budget that had not yet been received, delaying
expenses until the new year had begun, and borrowing against reve-
nues that existed only on paper.14
Mayor Wagner’s successor, John V. Lindsay, decried Wagner’s
borrowing spree while campaigning, but continued Wagner’s prac-
tices while he was mayor.15  When Abraham D. Beame took over the
Mayor’s office in 1974, he inherited a $1.5 billion deficit from Lind-
7. Donna E. Shalala & Carol Bellamy, supra note 2 at 1121. See also MAC REPORT
7.
8. Donna E. Shalala & Carol Bellamy, supra note 2 at 1122.
9. FRED FERRETTI, THE YEAR THE BIG APPLE WENT BUST 31 (1976).
10. The City of New York, Annual Report of the Comptroller, fiscal years 1961 and
1975, part 2-A, Statement 5.
11. Id.
12. FRED FERRETTI, THE YEAR THE BIG APPLE WENT BUST 28 (1976).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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2004] W. BERNARD RICHLAND 419
say.16  Beame eliminated jobs and ordered an eight and one-half
percent cut for all departments in his first year as mayor in an effort
to stem the deluge of debt that was going to force the city to default
on its loans.  Nonetheless, in the beginning of 1975, the city had
$12.3 billion in securities and interest outstanding.17
As the 1975 fiscal year opened, in the face of this mounting
debt, banks began to fidget and become panicky.18  Banks and
other municipal bond holders refused to bailout the city as the
city’s deficit reached fifty percent of total spending.19  This effec-
tively closed the municipal bond market to New York City.  Faced
with the possibility of defaulting on its debt, the city turned to the
state for assistance.  The state first advanced the city $800 million in
state aid.20  It then established the Municipal Assistance Corpora-
tion for the City of New York (MAC).21  MAC’s major responsibility
was to transfer the city’s short-term debt into long-term obliga-
tions.22  Unfortunately, even when the debt was backed by the state,
the investment community was reluctant to buy New York securities.
MAC next set about to create a rescue plan by placing the fiscal
rule of the city into the hands of state officials.23  The Emergency
Financial Control Board (Control Board) was created by the New
York Financial Emergency Act for the City of New York to control
the disbursement of city monies and to supervise the financial man-
agement of the city.24  In spite of all of these efforts, noteholders
still did not want to convert their existing bonds into MAC bonds or
buy the MAC bonds which would bail out the city.
On October 15, 1975, in the speech that follows, Richland pro-
claimed that New York City “would not disappear.”25  Nevertheless,
16. Id. at 87.
17. Id. at 90.
18. Id.
19. Lorraine Woellert, Control Board Unlikely to be Quick Fix for D.C., WASH.
TIMES, July 30, 1995, at A1.
20. Donna E. Shalala & Carol Bellamy, supra note 2 at 1129.
21. N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW §§ 3030-40 (McKinney 1970-75 Cum. Supp.).
22. Donna E. Shalala & Carol Bellamy, supra note 2 at 1128.
23. Id. at 1129.
24. Id.
25. W. Bernard Richland, Speech Before The National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers and World Conference on Law at Washington, D.C. (October 15, 1975) (tran-
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on October 16, 1975, the city came its closest to falling into default
when the teachers’ union refused to buy all of the MAC bonds they
had promised to buy in order to force a contract settlement.26  The
effect of this near default was felt throughout the U.S. and world
when trading opened on October 17, 1975.  Trading in bonds came
to a near halt and prices declined sharply.27  When word came in
the early afternoon that default had been averted (by finding funds
in other places), all of the earlier losses were erased with increased
trading.28  The effect of a real default would have been massive.
But Richland was right, New York City did not “disappear.”  Its fi-
nances were controlled by the state.  The federal government, in
November 1975, agreed to extend a temporary line of credit to the
city in order to cover the city’s operating costs.  But the city did
recover and prosper and remain the great city Richland describes.
26. FRED FERRETTI, supra note 9, at 339.
27. FRED FERRETTI, supra note 9, at 341.
28. FRED FERRETTI, supra note 9, at 341.
